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For over a decade, beginning in the late 1990s, discussion over softer modes of governance animated
academic scholarship in the ﬁelds of law, politics, and public policy. This debate was especially pro-
nounced in Europe. Since the late 2000s, however, discussion of this approach has declined precipitously.
Is the “soft governance” model dead? Or, more precisely, has the economic crisis killed it? This article
argues that, to the contrary, the EU’s austerity measures have made softer governance more relevant in
two quite distinct ways. Administratively, new mechanisms of health policy coordination are able to
provide policy solutions in a much more effective way than could more formal and rigid forms of legal
harmonisation. Politically, it establishes a normative perspective which uniﬁes actors across a number of
administrative units and challenges the dominant ideological force of the market-based principles upon
which the EU’s austerity policies are constructed.
 2014 Published by Elsevier Ltd.Open access under CC BY-NC-ND license.For over a decade, beginning in the late 1990s, discussion over
informal modes of political governance animated academic schol-
arship in the ﬁelds of law, politics, and public policy. This debate
was especially pronounced in Europe. Since the late 2000s, how-
ever, discussion of this approach has declined precipitously. Is it
simply the case that serious economic crises in Europe have focused
attention away from softer political issues (such as forms of
governance) in order to address more pressing issues of ﬁnancial
stability and economic growth? While the recession which began
late in 2008 did, unsurprisingly, divert much political attention to
economic issues, it did not eliminate interest in soft governance.
Rather, these “softer” approaches remained quite relevant for two
very discrete reasons: on the one hand, they provided a more
efﬁcient approach to policy development; on the other hand, they
served as a political armature upon which to articulate normative
alternatives to market-oriented principles.
The ﬁrst section of this paper discusses the theoretical devel-
opment of “experimental governance” (also known, inter alia, as “
new governance,” “soft governance,” or “soft law”), and why it
became particularly important in the ﬁeld of health care within the
European Union. It then explains how the restructuring ofess under CC BY-NC-ND license.economic governancemechanismswithin the EU in thewake of the
ﬁnancial crisis appeared to supercede this approach. The subse-
quent sections argue that, while the manifestation of soft gover-
nance has metamorphised considerably in the past decade, it has
become far from irrelevant. To the contrary, it now performs two
quite distinct functions. First, it provides a more efﬁcient means to
address complex health policy problems across overlapping juris-
dictions. Second, it establishes a normative perspective which
uniﬁes actors across a number of administrative units and chal-
lenges the dominant ideological force of market-based principles
upon which the EU’s austerity policies are constructed. Conceptu-
ally, this analysis is informed by discursive institutionalism
(Schmidt, 2008, 2013). However, it also suggests that discursive
approaches tend to be rather weak in their explanation of how,
precisely, politically contentious ideas are cultivated and diffused
within speciﬁc institutional contexts to challenge dominant idea-
tional approaches (and the consequent distribution of political
power and economic goods). To this end, Sabatier’s model of
advocacy coalitions is employed in order to explain the ways in
which political actors utilise the principles of soft governance for
speciﬁc political ends. While this explanatory framework could
potentially be applied to a number of institutional relationships
outside of health care and even beyond the EU, the scope of this
article is restricted to health policy within the EU.
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document and literature review with semi-structured key infor-
mant interviews of ofﬁcials in European Commission Directorates
and non-state actors in Brussels and Luxembourg from 2008 to
2013. The principal focus for interviews was DG-SANCO, as this
Directorate has the most direct responsibility for health-related
policy within the EU. Given the “snowball” methodology
employed by the study, however, many ofﬁcials within DG-EMPL
were later added to the interview list. Ethics approval for this
project was obtained from the author’s university following the
requirements outlined in the Tri-Council Statement on Ethical
Conduct for Research Involving Humans. The funding sources for this
project were the Canadian Institutes of Health Research (CIHR) and
the European Union Centres of Excellence (EUCE).1. What is “experimental governance”?
Formal legal systems require stability, predictability, and uni-
form applicability. Policy areas such as health care are highly
complex, rapidly evolving, and involve actors with vastly different
needs and capacities. The best institutional structures for modern
health care governance often collide with the overarching consti-
tutional structures that have evolved to address the broader po-
litical goals of conﬂict resolution and economic growth. The
evolution of the European Union is one example of this disjunction.
Designed to protect national autonomy over domestic affairs while
promoting economic union and political amity between states, the
laws and institutions of the EU were not constructed to facilitate
the development of effective and sustainable health care policy.
While contemporary health care increasingly requires greater
collaboration and coordination across jurisdictions, the original
provisions of the EU explicitly prohibited formal supranational
coordination of health care across Member States. Because of this,
European health policy from the late 1990s to the late 2000s wit-
nessed the efﬂorescence of new experimental modes of governance
that attempted to facilitate the sustainable development of Euro-
pean health policy within the more rigid framework of European
law.
What, exactly, is meant by “soft” or “experimental” approaches
to governance? Despite the huge volume of literature written in
this area, there is still little agreement on how to deﬁne it or how to
approach it analytically (Köhler-Koch and Rittberger, 2006;
Tömmel and Verdun, 2009; Benz, 2009). While the term actually
encapsulates a huge variation of principles and processes, at its
most basic the concept simply refers to approaches that are not
reducible to hierarchical command-and-control models. And, as
Hervey and McHale write, while soft-law norms have always
played a part in EU policy-making, it is nonetheless possible clearly
to differentiate between “old-style legislative harmonisation” and
“new approach harmonisation” (2004: 48e62) The distinction be-
tween hard and soft forms of law and governance is often repre-
sented in binary form: static/transformative; substantive/
procedural; rigid/ﬂexible; prescriptive/informative; demanding of
uniformity/accepting of diversity; stable and lasting/provisional
and revisable, and so on (Scott and Trubek, 2002; Eberlein and
Kerwer, 2004; Walker and de Búrka, 2007; Sabel and Zeitlin,
2010; Armstrong, 2011). The problem is that what is considered
under the rubric of “soft governance” is, in consequence, quite
disparate and often contradictory. One encompassing deﬁnition of
new governance has been articulated by Klein (2008: 10), who
states that
[i]nstead of a top-down, hierarchical rule-based system where
failures to adhere are sanctioned, or unregulated market-based
approaches, the new governance school posits a moreparticipatory and collaborative model of regulation in which
multiple stakeholders, including, depending on the context,
government, civil society, business and nonproﬁt organizations,
collaborate to achieve a common purpose. In order to encourage
ﬂexibility and innovation, “new governance” approaches favor
more process-oriented political strategies like disclosure re-
quirements, benchmarking, and standard-setting, audited self-
regulation, and the threat of imposition of default “regulatory
regimes” to be applied where there is a lack of good-faith effort
at achieving desired goals.
What explains the explosion of new governance literature from
the mid-1990s to the end of the 2000s? Intellectually, political
scientists were beginning to move away from the study of formal
institutions to a more discursive approach focussing on the con-
struction of ideas (Schmidt, 2008), and from the study of “gov-
ernment” to the process of governing (Bell et al., 2010; Bakvis,
2010). This movement away from simple institutionalism was
also inﬂuenced by schools of thought that focused upon collective
action analysis (e.g., Ostrom, 1990). All of these analytical frame-
works focused upon the role of negotiation between political actors
as a complement to both market-oriented processes and formal
hierarchical relationships.
But it was the evolution of a more integrated European Union
following the Treaty of Maastricht in 1993 which gave these
analytical tools so much immediate relevancy. The deeper integra-
tion of an increasing number of states meant that the “classic
Community method” of harmonisation through binding legal texts
was becoming more cumbersome and unwieldy. The European
Union has always relied upon a softer form of governance compared
to sovereign states (Tömmel and Verdun, 2009), as it depends upon
Member States to adopt and enforce the myriad of “resolutions,
recommendations, opinion, notices, communications, action pro-
grammes or plans, declarations, and communiqués” that comprise a
signiﬁcant part of its policy-making role (Hervey andMcHale, 2004:
61). But the European Union was, like most sovereign states, expe-
riencing a declining capacity to execute effective policy and provide
public goods in an increasingly complex and rapidly changing social
context (Sand, 1998). At the same time, the growth of complicated
and distant bureaucratic processes led to a political backlash by
European citizens against the institutions of the European Union
itself; and by the mid-1990s the European Commission began to
address the perceived democratic deﬁcit of the EU (Decker, 2002).
By embracing a rhetoric of consultation and collaboration, the Eu-
ropean Commission hoped to shift public focus on the EU to a more
innovative and inclusive democratic experiment in place of the
source of impenetrable bureaucratic dictates to the EU (Hix, 1998).
A separate political motivation for the endorsement of new
governance approaches within the EU stemmed from the explicit
market-oriented agenda of the EU as an institution. Those Member
States which valued a more solidarity-based “European social
model” became increasingly concerned that the legal framework
supporting greater economic integration would undermine their
ability to operate more distributive social programmes in policy
areas which had been considered matters clearly under national
jurisdiction. In response to greater economic integration, these states
entered into what has been termed a “constitutional compromise”.
Counteractingmarket-based strategies by ceding authority on social
issues to unelected bureaucrats within the EU was just as unpalat-
able as the problem itself. But by accepting a common process that
would coordinate social policywithout undermining formal political
authority, Member States could counterbalance the inherently
fragmentary tendencies of free-market policies without relinquish-
ing national authority (Dawson, 2010).
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health care has been subject to a remarkable level of discussion in
the past decade. To an extent this should not prove exceptional, as
Member States are, under Article 168(2) TFEU (exArticle 152(5) TEC)
required to “coordinate amongst themselves their policies and
programmes” to achieve public health goals. More interesting is the
way in which the mechanisms of soft governance have also served
larger political ends, though where the former ends and the latter
begins is the subject of considerable interpretation. In simple terms,
the conﬂict can be understood as a tension between Article 56 TFEU
(ex Article 49 EC), which allows EU citizens to provide or to seek
services anywhere in the EU (the two “fundamental freedoms” of
the internalmarket), and Article 168 TFEU (ex Article 152 EC), which
places Member States under a duty to ensure a “high level of pro-
tection of human health.” Article 152 was itself a strengthening of
the older Article 129, and was enacted under the Maastricht Treaty
as a political response to the policy failures in Europe following the
outbreak of BSE in the 1980s. Article 168 gives Member States the
explicit authority over “the management of health services and
medical care and the allocation of resources assigned to them.” Yet a
series of decisions rendered by the European Court of Justice inter-
preted the relative authority of Articles 56 and168 tomake the latter
subject to the former (seeHancher and Sauter, 2012). In otherwords,
Member States were still free “to determine the content and the
scope of entitlements to medical treatment under their public na-
tional health (insurance) systems, provided that this is effected in
such a way that any restrictions on free movement are objective,
non-discriminatory on the basis of nationality or residence, subject
to judicial review and interpreted in a non-discriminatory EU
context” (Hervey and McHale, 2004: 133).
What this meant was that patients were free to ﬁnd providers
across the EU and to be reimbursed by insurance providers within
their home country. The worry was that this practice could result in
a high inﬂux of individuals seeking treatment in speciﬁc states,
which could lead to an excessive demand on these states’ capacity
to plan for or provide adequate and sustainable health services.
Notwithstanding certain conditions, national health care systems
in Europe “may no longer be viewed as ‘closed systems’”
(Neergraard, 2011: 36). In the face of this formal “deregulatory
thrust” on health care systems imposed by consecutive decisions of
the European Court of Justice, political actors within and outside of
the formal state sector turned to softer forms of health policy co-
ordination as “tools of public action” (Greer and Vanhercke, 2010:
82). By establishing an informal alliance protecting the capacity of
Member States to preserve more solidaristic aspects of health
systems across Member States, the political strategy was to estab-
lish a bulwark against the encroachment of Article 56 in the realm
of health care. The political struggle over the direction of European
health policy, then, has been informed by two interrelated dy-
namics: on the one hand is the tension between national authority
over health policy (Art 168) and the pervasiveness of the market
even in areas of ostensible national jurisdiction (Art 56). Both op-
tions lead logically to a highly fragmented system of health care
across Europe. On the other hand is tension between the deregu-
lation of health care through hard law (the decisions of the Euro-
pean Court of Justice) and the articulation of a more solidaristic
“European Social Market” through softer mechanisms of policy
coordination across states. Both options here lead to greater coor-
dination, but on vastly different terms.
2. The “new economic governance”
The Lisbon Agenda of the 2000s was a blueprint for the evolu-
tion of the EU. It attempted to create a compromise between an
economic and a social agenda, and between national sovereigntyand a coordinated sense of direction. Softer modes of governance
were an essential component of this approach. But the subprime
meltdown in 2008 precipitated the ﬁnancial crisis which, by 2010,
caused the EU to begin negotiations to strengthen the Stability and
Growth Pact which allowed the EC to enhance its surveillance of
the budgetary polices of Member States before they came into ef-
fect. The purpose of this new approach to economic governance
was to enhance budgetary discipline across states. One measure to
this end was controlling public expenditure; and, as a sizable
component of this was social expenditure, public health spending
was directly affected. Did this “new economic governance” eradi-
cate interest in softer forms of governance altogether? Or did it
simply reﬁne the ways in which soft governance could usefully be
applied?
The key mechanism of the new economic governance was the
“European Semester,” an annual cycle of economic and ﬁscal co-
ordination across the EU. Interestingly, this system is largely based
upon the very discursive and iterative principles established within
many new governance instruments. The Commission evaluates
each Member State’s proposed budget plan individually, and de-
velops feedback and advice for each one. States are “invited” to
implement the advice presented to them. Although follow-through
is formally voluntary (hard sanctions are only applicable to those
countries e Ireland, Greece, and Portugal e subject to EU-IMF joint
adjustment programmes) “the EU can issue policy warnings and,
ultimately, enforce compliance through incentives and sanctions”
(Baeten and Thomson, 2012: 189). While health care was not
explicitly included in the 2011 Annual Growth Survey (AGS), it did
become part of the AGS for 2012. That health care systems should
be subject to some form of overarching coordination at EU level had
been discussed for some time (e.g., in the public health pro-
grammes of 2003e08 and 2008e13, and in the 2010 Joint Report on
Health Systems published by the EC and the Economic Policy
Committee). But the inclusion of health care coordination within a
context of economic austerity measures was not what many had
anticipated. Nonetheless, that health carewould be targeted as part
of the EC’s new strategy on ﬁscal surveillance was not surprising,
despite Member States’ formal legal jurisdiction over health care,
given that health care spending comprises an average of 10% of
states’ GDP, and an average of 80% of health care in the EU is funded
through the public sector (Ahtonen, 2013: 1).
2.1. The new face of soft governance in European health care
The political dynamics underlying European health policy shif-
ted abruptly after 2008, when the subprimemeltdown precipitated
a ﬁnancial crisis which focused policy attention quite sharply away
from social issues and on to economic ones. The details of this shift
are complicated and cannot be analysed here. One point worth
noting, however, is that due to the emphasis on ﬁnancial strin-
gency, national health policies began to be viewed as legitimate
policy domain for EU-level decision-making, notwithstanding
Member States’ formal legal jurisdiction over health care. Given
that health care spending comprises an average of 10% of states’
GDP, and an average of 80% of health care in the EU is funded
through the public sector (Ahtonen, 2013: 1), this was not partic-
ularly surprising.
Yet ideas are rarely static; and it is not remarkable that ideas and
processes as complicated and variegated as experimental gover-
nance should shape themselves in response to a new political
landscape. In the case of soft governance, two distinct trends are
notable. Administratively and procedurally, older mechanisms such
as the OMC have been superceded by newer instruments that
retain informal processes of collective governance, but which are
deﬁned by much tighter parameters and expectations. Politically
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serve as a philosophical position where those critical of market-
based assumptions and strategies can come together and articu-
late their objections in a more systemic and uniﬁed manner.
2.1.1. The open method of coordination (OMC)
Of all the mechanisms of soft governance, the OMC has by far
received the most attention. First introduced in 1997 to facilitate
the development of the European Employment Strategy, the OMC
was very quickly applied to a number of other policy areas. While
the detailed application of the OMC in each respective ﬁeld is
slightly different, the basic design is similar. The OMC is a recursive
system of policy development in which very general policy objec-
tives are agreed upon at the EU level. Then more speciﬁc goals and
indicators, articulated in a formal Council resolution, are estab-
lished by the Ministerial Council in the policy area involved. This
process is facilitated by the European Commission. Each Member
State then develops a set of national reports both explaining the
current situation of the state vis-à-vis the policy area (including
challenges and best practices) and outlining the speciﬁc strategies
that would best allow it to fulﬁl the general goals established at the
European level. These strategies are unique to each country, but are
developed under the rubric of a coherent overarching policy.
When the health care OMC was launched in 2004, it included a
component on long term care. When it became fully operational-
ised in 2006, it was “streamlined” into a larger OMC on Social
Protection and Social Inclusion that also included “pension” and
“social inclusion” streams as well. The evaluation of the health care
OMC has generally been quite mixed, as most countries have been
more forthcoming about reporting existing national health policies
than in developing new ones (Kröger, 2011). Yet evaluation of the
OMC is hobbled by a lack of consensus regarding what, precisely, an
OMC is supposed to do. In February 2013 the Social Protection
Committee produced its ﬁrst annual report “in the context of the
reinvigorated social open method of coordination” (DG-EMPT,
2013: 12). The report uses a new instrument referred to as the
“Social Protection Performance Monitor.” Using a dashboard of key
social indicators monitored annually for statistically signiﬁcant
changes, the instrument serves as a solid, quantitative evidence
base for a review of causes and solutions for trends identiﬁed by
these indicators.
Many ofﬁcials interviewed pointed out that the utility of dis-
cussion on social policy within the OMC was not unidimensional.
The many new, weaker states in the EU certainly did beneﬁt from
the exposure to other states’ “best practices,” the process of peer
review, and the access to EC expertise that they did not possess.
Another ofﬁcial stated that the states which beneﬁt from the OMC
process are not always the ones one expects: occasionally it is the
smaller states with more limited resources that can offer more
creative and realistic solutions to speciﬁc policy problems that
larger states, especially in the current climate, ﬁnd useful. At the
same time, however, the older and more powerful Member States
were directly exposed to the challenges and limitations of the
newer and weaker ones; and this greater comprehension of the
vulnerability faced by new Member States was very useful in a
broader sense in bolstering the tolerance of states with greater
capacity for those with less.
2.1.2. Joint Action strategies
There is ongoing debate over the role of the OMC in current EU
policy-making. While the high proﬁle of the OMC has led some to
call it the “ﬁfth mode of policy-making in the EU” (Wallace, 2010),
the OMC is no longer explicitly articulated in Europe 2020, the EU’s
current long-term planning strategy (de la Porte and Pochet, 2012).
Because the OMC process has been seen as too broad and toounfocussed to achieve the immediate and quantiﬁable results that
are the hallmarks of policy success, the use of OMCs has quietly
been eclipsed within the ﬁeld of health policy by the use of Joint
Action strategies and Reference Networks. Joint Actions were
clearly designed with an eye to the criticisms levied at the OMC
process. They were established in 2008 and, in a sense, they are
derived from the same theoretical format of the OMCs as they are a
collaborative, voluntary, and non-binding exercise in mutual
learning. The difference is that the objectives, scope, methods, and
evaluative processes are much more clearly deﬁned.
Joint Action strategies are very precise policy initiatives that are
funded jointly by the European Commission and by other partici-
pating countries (normally these are Member States, but all states
within the European Economic Area and European Free Trade As-
sociation are eligible). Key NGOs (such as the WHO, OECD, and
EMCDDA) are also welcome to participate. Joint Actions are
generally funded on a 50/50 basis, although the Commission will
shoulder up to 70% of the costs in cases of “exceptional utility”. The
focus of Joint Action strategies is generally quite precise (health
indicators, rare diseases, nanomaterials, congenital anomalies, or-
gan donation, e-health governance, HIV, pharmacovigilance,
alcohol use), although some topics are by their very nature more
complex (chronic disease, cancer, health inequalities, health human
resources, mental health and well-being). The stated objective of
the Joint Action strategy is to identify common priorities between
states, and to facilitate communication and coordination between
them. Capacity gaps and best practices are noted, potential strate-
gies of cooperation are discussed, and modes of operationalisation
are developed. Unlike OMCs, the attempt is, as one interviewee
noted, to see that the EU’s monies are “well spent”. The funding
period is clearly limited (up to 36 months) and potential deliver-
ables must be identiﬁed ex ante.
Any potential participant is free to submit a proposal for Joint
Action funding, though many of the programmes have been ini-
tiatives led by a current Council’s presidency (such as Spain’s
support for the health inequalities programme). Speciﬁc countries
normally act as “leads” on issues in which they are particularly
interested (France and the UK have been the most active in coor-
dinating Joint Actions), and states are free to join if they believe that
a particular focus is especially relevant to their jurisdiction. The
focus of the Joint Actions is more on implementing existing
knowledge than producing new ideas. Rather than isolated pilot
projects, Joint Actions are attempts at executing best practices
across jurisdictions. Effort is made to achieve economies of scale,
promotion of best practices, facilitating networks, and establishing
benchmarks. The results are to be quite concrete, and are expected
to be permanently institutionalised.
2.1.3. Reference Networks
A much more recent addition to governance instruments in
European health care is the “Reference Network.” Like Joint Actions,
Reference Networks are very speciﬁc, and seek to coordinate and
integrate existing practices and institutions on a voluntary basis.
The need for such mechanisms was largely driven by the formal
recognition in 2011 that an integrated European approach to health
care was essential. The framework for this coordination was the
Directive on Patients’ Rights on Cross-Border Healthcare. The
Directive, which governs the rights of healthcare workers and pa-
tients to move across Member States, was the political response to
the accumulation of decisions by the European Court of Justice
stipulating limits to Member States’ jurisdiction over their respec-
tive health care systems. Article 12 of the newDirective requires the
European Commission to work together with Member States to
establish networks of excellence across states in areas where
“critical mass” becomes especially important in the treatment of
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treatment of rare diseases, although it also applies to conditions
requiring a high level of investment in speciﬁc equipment and
technologies, or a considerable degree of expertise or multidisci-
plinary capacity (Palm et al., 2013). While the treatment of patients
is the ﬁrst objective of the European Reference Networks, other
goals include medical training, expanded research capacity, the
establishment of registries and databases, the support and devel-
opment of patients’ networks, and the articulation of best practices
and benchmarks.
But it is important to remember that the Directive does not in
itself establish the European Reference Networks; it merely stipu-
lates the responsibility of the EC to support Member States in this
effort. The political dynamics underlying this endeavour are sub-
stantial. The ﬁrst issue is that of funding: who pays for the Refer-
ence Networks? The long-term sustainability of the networks is to
rest with the Member States themselves. The states which have
expressed the most interest are, unsurprisingly, the larger ones e
Germany, France, the UK, Spain, Italy, and Belgium e but it is the
smaller and poorer states with their limited capacity who stand to
gain themost. Intervieweeswere unsure how the problem of access
was to be resolved: some expected that the least wealthy states
would be given an “associate membership” to allow them the
beneﬁts of the centralised expertise; others worried that such
states would be “cut out” of the process. Another issue is that of
organisation: who runs the networks? The process of organisation
is to be a “bottom up” rather than “top down” process, but the
demands of coordination introduce the possibility of hierarchal
management of the networks. A related question is: who evaluates
the progress of the networks? Evaluation across networks requires
consistency, but a European level of evaluation raises the ever-
present issue of erosion of the principle of subsidiarity. Finally,
there are intrastate issues within federal jurisdictions (such as
Germany) over the determination of expertise (does this rest with
the federal state, or with the länder themselves?). Interestingly,
what the Directive on Cross-Border Care (and speciﬁcally the
requirement to develop Reference Networks) illustrates is that the
execution of “hard” law in health care at the European level does
not preclude the use of soft governance techniques but seems,
rather, to require them.
2.1.4. The “High Level Process of Reﬂection”
The shift from OMCs to Joint Actions and Reference Networks
demonstrates a move from quite broad processes to much more
deﬁned ones. But it would be a mistake to assume that this is
indicative of the trajectory of soft governance as a whole. For
well over a decade the EU has been establishing a “competence”
(or legal jurisdiction) over health care, not only through EJC
decisions on free movement and on human rights (McHale,
2010) but also though its new approach to economic gover-
nance. What this means is that it has become useful to think
about health care systems from a more encompassing European
perspective. But the perspective that is expressed depends to a
large extent upon who is articulating the vision, and visions are
highly politically-charged creations. As the following cases
illustrate, established soft governance instruments also perform
a highly political function that is quite separate from their
instrumental role.
A High Level Process of Reﬂection is an ad hoc process that is
established to address a particular concern; it is not a clearly reg-
ularised practice. As a “High Level” process it is generally comprised
of representatives from the relevant Council (in this case,
Employment, Social Policy, Health and Consumer Affairs, DG-EMPT,
supported primarily by the Directorate General for Health and
Consumers, DG-SANCO). The lack of administrative rigiditycombined with the participation of key high-level individuals
means that it is a body able to engage in substantial policy planning
without being impeded by the usual bureaucratic complexities of
EU policy-making; the disadvantage is that it is not a particularly
transparent process. One High Level Process of Reﬂection was un-
dertaken in the early 2000s as “an initial effort to map out the
consequences of (especially) internal market law for health ser-
vices” (Greer and Vanhercke, 2010), and in 2004 it was folded into
the High Level Group on Health Services and Medical Care, which
was itself formally suspended in 2009. This was partly due to the
development of a European Health Strategy, commencing in 2008,
to provide a coherent framework for action at the European level.
But by 2011, after the implementation of the European Semester, it
was becoming clear that EU health policy goals were increasingly
deﬁned by the need to cut public expenditure at the Member State
level. Strategically, then, the subsequent High Level Process of
Reﬂection was an attempt to re-think the project of European
health systems in a manner that did not, like the initial responses
articulated by the European Semester process, jeopardise long-
term public health objectives.
In April 2011, concerned health ministers from a number of
Member States convened to initiate a new High Level Process of
Reﬂection entitled “Towards modern, responsive, and sustainable
health systems”. The focus of the strategy was not subtle. The
Council document establishing the High Level Process of Reﬂection
stressed the need to “ensure that health is adequately addressed in
the National Reform Programmes submitted by Member States
within the framework of the Europe 2020 strategy;” to “reposition
the perception of health policy, making it more visible when
macroeconomic issues are at stake,” and to further strengthen long-
term health promotion and disease prevention planning (Council of
the European Union, 2011). The process was also a strategicmove to
allocate as much funding from the new round of Structural Fund
programmes (2014e2020) as possible to the ﬁeld of health care
(currently only 2 per cent of the Structural Funds are used for health
care).
The High Level Process of Reﬂection is under the purview of
the Senior Level Working Party on Public Health, and is scheduled
to present its ﬁnal report in October 2013. Because of the “high
level” nature of this policy instrument, with Ministers of Health
playing a leading role, the likelihood of “buy in” by Member States
is considerably higher than it would be if undertaken by mid-level
bureaucrats subject to several levels of administrative approval.
The problem with the High Level Process of Reﬂection, as in-
terviewees noted, is that the ad hoc nature of the procedure
means that there is often a lack of continuity and follow-up of
recommendations. To address this deﬁciency, the 2011 Reﬂection
Process has articulated an intent to focus on the long-term
planning and stability of projects, especially after the termina-
tion of the Structural Funds which initially support them, and to
develop a “practical toolbox” (including ex ante indicators of
performance) to assist Member States in implementing the pro-
posed policies.
As an instrument of soft governance in the ﬁeld of European
health policy, the High Level Process of Reﬂection serves two
purposes. The ﬁrst is the standard “soft law” objective of coordi-
nating interests, engaging them in discussion, establishing com-
mon interests, developing possible solutions, and operationalising
collaborative but discretionary policy in key areas. The second
role is much more political, and serves as a forum for those
favouring a pan-European approach to health care that is not
premised on market principles. The current Process of Reﬂection
does not challenge the need to make states’ health care systems
more responsive to the ﬁnancial limitations of the economic
landscape. Rather, it suggests alternate ways of doing so. Instead
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endorses strategies such as integrated care, volume drug pur-
chasing, e-health systems, enhanced primary care, better use of
health human resources, and the exchange of best practices. None
of the solutions proposed by the ﬁnal report of the High Level
Process will be novel or unexpected. The point of the process, to a
large extent, is simply to reinforce the point that there are other
ways to think about restructuring health care in an environment
of constrained ﬁscal capacity. As with the former High Level
Process of Reﬂection in health care, the current process was
established only when the political context produced a discursive
contest over deﬁning the nature and function of health care
systems.
2.1.5. The EU Health Forum
As noted above, it had become clear by the early 2000s that
the decisions of the European Court of Justice were reshaping
the contours of Member States’ health care systems. At this point
the European Commission was beginning to articulate the need
for some overarching coordination of national health systems,
notwithstanding its limited formal legal competence in the area.
To allay concerns that this was a shadowy form of “competence
creep” that would lead to more health policy-making within the
subterranean decision-making apparatuses of the Commission
(especially within the context of the EU’s perceived “democratic
deﬁcit”), the European Union Health Forum was established in
2001 as an umbrella organisation for the health sector “to
ensure that the European Commission’s health policy is trans-
parent and responsive to public concerns” (EU Health Policy
Forum, 2009: 1).
The composition of the Health Forum is balanced between
health NGOs, representatives of health professionals and trade
unions, health service providers and health insurance, and busi-
nesses with an interest in “health promotion, protection, and
improvement.” The Health Forum currently has 52 members. Pro-
cedurally, there are two components to the Health Forum. The
European Union Health Policy Forum (EUHPF) meets twice a year to
discuss the strategic priorities established by the Forum and the
Commission at previous meetings. The Open Health Forum (OHF)
comprises interested parties from thewider community, andmeets
once a year to discuss an agenda prepared jointly by the Commis-
sion and the EUHPF. Both groups are advisory bodies only, and all
recommendations are non-binding.
How effective has the Health Forum been? Again, the attempt
to evaluate such a mechanism depends largely upon how one
deﬁnes its purpose. Formally, the role of the Forum is to support
the implementation of the European Health Strategy, with an
especial focus upon enhancing citizen engagement more broadly.
A report commissioned by DG-SANCO to evaluate the 2008
Health Strategy at its midpoint noted that the Forum “fulﬁlled its
role as a communication channel, even if too ‘one-way’ with in-
formation ﬂowing principally from the Commission to members,”
but “did not necessarily achieve its full potential as a tool for
proposing policy options and identifying emerging health issues
and shaping (or giving feedback on) policy proposals and
implementing measures” (PHEIAC, 2011:12). This account was
largely corroborated by EC ofﬁcials and NGOs interviewed by the
author. Some of the larger NGOS were quite dismissive of the
process, although smaller ones found the access to information
about the Commission’s plans to be useful. At the same time,
some ofﬁcials found it advantageous to ﬂoat ideas to the Forum
as a means of gauging their reaction to speciﬁc policy proposals.
Interestingly, since the establishment of the European Semester
system, the role of the Health Policy Forum has solidiﬁed more
concretely into a discursive one similar to that of the High LevelProcess of Reﬂection. Like the Reﬂection Process, the Health
Policy Forum has increasingly focused upon developing a sys-
tematic critique of the European Semester process vis-à-vis Eu-
ropean health policy.
3. The role and nature of soft governance in European health
policy
This account of the instruments of soft governance in European
health policy is not exhaustive: there are other mechanismse such
as the Social Dialogue e which could potentially be added to the
discussion. What can be concluded from even this limited discus-
sion, however, is that the experimental modes of governance that
gained prominence in the EU in the last decade are not obsolete.
Soft approaches to governance will continue to thrive because they
fulﬁl two very signiﬁcant purposes. The ﬁrst is instrumental: new
governancemechanisms are useful because, in many cases, they are
simply a more effective way of getting things done. They facilitate
policy development in ways that a strict imposition of legal har-
monisation cannot. This is especially true in the ﬁeld of health care,
where rapid technological change, high complexity, the need for
scale economies, the quest for best practices, the focus on patient-
oriented care, and the need for interjurisdictional cooperation
mean that the static, rigid, and homogeneous model of traditional
command-and-control systems is increasingly unable to accom-
modate an efﬁcient and sustainable model of health care. Trubek
et al. (2008) describe four functional advantages to softer forms
of governance over more traditional ones: they are better at gath-
ering local clinical knowledge or information on patients’ cultural
diversity; they are more efﬁcient at transferring knowledge from
the clinical setting to higher-level agencies; they are ﬂexible
enough to facilitate learning while encouraging further experi-
mentation; and they are able to close the “regulatory gap” that
exists when the lack of ﬁt between goals and tools hinders optimal
results.
But soft governance instruments also perform a signiﬁcant
discursive function in the EU. This approach sees political change
to be the result of the persuasive force of narratives that chal-
lenge dominant ways of thinking about the world around us
(Schmidt, 2013). But ideas do not exist independently of political
interests; and political interests require vehicles through which
to articulate their ideas. This can be seen in the way in which
certain soft governance instruments such as the Open Method of
Coordination, the High Level Process of Reﬂection, the Social
Dialogue, and the Health Forum have been building a coherent
discursive account focussing on coordinated investment in bet-
ter health services across Europe (in contradistinction to indis-
criminate cuts to public health care expenditure). Yet a
limitation of discursive theoretical approaches is that they pro-
vide little explanatory clarity: how, precisely, are oppositional
ideas developed and diffused in a particular political context?
Which actors use what kind of strategies to accomplish their
objectives? Discursive approaches are most useful when com-
bined with more detailed explanations of political causality; in
this case, Sabatier’s theory of advocacy coalition can be usefully
applied to illustrate the way in which discursive challenges can
be operationalised.
It is no coincidence that the critical narratives emanating from
the various fora discussed above sound remarkably consistent, as
most of these processes are coordinated through the same
administrative units. As Miliband (1969) described in his analysis
of the state, different state institutions tend to represent different
interests in society. A more sophisticated modern version of this
theory is the “advocacy coalition” approach, which holds that
various interests in society attempt to inﬂuence policy by joining
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speciﬁc state institutions (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1993).
While all Directorates-General are bureaucratic state institutions
and are therefore formally politically neutral, it is commonly un-
derstood that certain Directorates (such as DG-SANCO and DG-
EMPT) are institutional homes for political actors and interests
who support solidarity-oriented policies, while others such as DG-
ECFIN (Economic and Financial Affairs), DG-MARKT (Internal
Market and Services) and DG-RESEARCH (Research and Innova-
tion) are homes for those with more of a market orientation (see,
e.g., Greer and Vanhercke, 2010). The reorientation of health ser-
vices to meet the legal decisions of the European Court of Justice
was largely under the purview of MARKT, and the reorganisation
of economic governance following the economic crisis is sup-
ported by ECFIN.
It is possible to say, then, that the competing visions for Euro-
pean health policy are institutionally grounded in two discrete di-
rectorates. The disjuncture in vision over the future of European
health policy is most clearly illustrated by the fact that, while ECFIN
has been the most dominant institution in the coordination of the
European Semester (including, pointedly, health services), it does
not consult with the unit e SANCO e with the most expertise in
health policy. A number of interviewees held that ECFIN, the
directorate responsible for drafting country-speciﬁc reform pro-
posals in the area of health care, did not have a good understanding
of what was required for sustainable health care simply because it
did not understand the nature of health policy per se particularly
well. But the current dominance of ECFIN over European health
policy (through the European Semester) should not be overstated.
In the ﬁrst place, the inﬂuence of SANCO (once considered a very
weak directorate) has been steadily increasing as the need to co-
ordinate European health care has been recognised and institu-
tionalised. In addition to simply being responsible for “public
health” in a larger sense, SANCO supports relatively important
health programs and strategies such as the consecutive Health
Strategies, the Health Impact Assessments, the 2011 Directive on
cross-border health care, and oversight of pharmaceutical policy
(until recently under the purview of MARKT). In the second place,
the close afﬁliation of SANCO to EMPT bolsters its ability to promote
its health care agenda. Ofﬁcials explained that there is an “inner
circle” of key directorates (ECFIN, MARKT, EMPT, and TAX) that are
consulted in the European Semester process. SANCO is not
included, but the communication between SANCO and EMPT is
quite detailed and sustained, and there is an increasingly strategic
alignment of policy between the units. For example, the High Level
Reﬂection process (supported by SANCO) is calling for greater use of
European Structural Funds in health and, notably, these Structural
Funds are administered by EMPT. It is difﬁcult to determine the
balance of power between ECFIN and EMPT, but some interviewees
have noted that there is now increasing internal discussion in the
European Semester process over the need for country-speciﬁc re-
form recommendations to take a longer-term approach to
sustainability.
There is, in sum, a clear trajectory in the way that soft gover-
nance mechanisms are being used within the sphere of European
health policy. Administratively, soft governance plays a very spe-
ciﬁc and important role in facilitating the interoperationalisation of
health policy upon which an effective and sustainable European
network of health care systems depends. Politically, these modes of
governance also create a broader discursive space in the health
policy debate which allows a constellation of interests to present a
coherent alternative to the development of health care at a Euro-
pean level. At times these two functions overlap; at other times
they do not. But there is little reason to believe that they are either
irrelevant, or destined to disappear.Acknowledgement
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